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The institution of the family provides individuals with risk sharing
opportunities which may not otherwise be available. Within the family there
is a degree of trust and a level of information which alleviates three key
problems in the provision of insurance by markets open to the general public,
namely moral hazard, adverse selection, and deception. In addition, provision
of insurance within the family may entail smaller transaction costs than arise
in the purchase of insurance on the open market. Therearea number of
important risks for which the "public" market problems of moral hazard,
adverse selection, and deception are especially severe. The risk of loss
of job or earnings because of changes in the pattern of demand or partial
disability is one example. Here the ability of the "public" market to
determine the extent to which the individual contributed to his earnings
loss or is simply lying about his backache is highly questionable. Other
examples are the risk of bankruptcy and the default risk on personal loans.
Many family practices in dealing with these types of risks can be explained
as implicit insurance contracts made ex ante by completely selfish family
membexs. Love and affection may be important for the enforcement of these
implicit contracts, but these need not be their sole or even chief
*Theresearch reported here is part of the NBER's research program in
Social Insurance. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and not
those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.2
determinant. Healthy brother A's support for disabled brother B may simply
be the quid pro quo for brother B's past implicit promise to support A if A
had become disabled instead of B.
The informational advantages of pooling risk within families must be set
against the inability of families to provide complete insurance •because of the
small size of the risk pooling group. The theory of insurance invokes the law
of large numbers to demonstrate that a sufficiently large group of people can
capture all the gains from risk pooling; the theory does not tell us how far
a small group of people can go in pooling risk. The rate at which diminishing
returns to additional people sets in in risk pooling appear to be an unex—
plored topic in the economic literature
Understanding how well family risk sharing arrangements substitute for
market risk sharing arrangements is important not only for explainingthe ex-
cess insurance demand facing public markets given the existence of families, but
also for understanding the economic incentives for marriage and family formation
when complete and fair public insurance markets do not exist.
This paper is concerned with the provision within the
family of insurance against the risk of running out of consumption resources
because of greater than average longevity. For a single individual the problem
is how to eat a pie over time when one does not know how long one will
continue to live. Too much consumption when young may mean relative poverty
later on if one lives "too long"; alternatively, if one is excessively frugal
when oung, there is the risk of dying without ever having satisfied one's
hunger. A complete annuity market permits an individual to hedge this
uncertainty of the date of death by exchanging his initial pie for a
stream of pie slices that continue as long as the individual survives. This3
paper demonstrates that implicit contractual arrangements within marriage and
the family can substitute to a large extent for the purchase of annuities in
public markets. Risk sharing arrangements within the family effectively con-
stitute an incomplete annuities market. Our analysis indicates that these
arrangements even in small families can substitute by more than7O% for com-
plete annuities. Given the adverse selection problem and transactions costs
in public annuity markets, contracting within an incomplete family annuity
market may well be preferred to purchasing annuities in the more complete public
market) In the absence of organized public markets in annuities, theserisk
sharing arrangements provide powerful economic incentives for marriage and fam-
ily formation.
Throughout the paper individuals are assumed to be completely selfish,
i.e., they obtain utility only from their own consumption. One implication of
this approach is that voluntary transfers from children to parents or bequests
and gifts from parents to children need have nothing at all to do with altruistic
feelings; rather, they may simply reflect risk sharing behavior of completely
selfish individuals. However, some level of mutual trust and honesty is required
since elements of these arrangements are not legally enforceable.
This paper is divided into four sections. The first section describes
optimal consumption behavior for a single individual both in the presence of
and in the absence of fair annuity markets. W(discuss the income and sub-
stitution effects involved in the provision of fair annuities and calculate
the wlfarE gains from access to a complete and fair annuity market for the
case of the iso—elastic utility function.
Section two develops the theoretical argument for Pareto efficient implicit
family annuity contracts and explores potential welfare gains arising from these4
arrangements. We present a proof that this implicit family contracting con-
verges to a complete annuities market as the number of family members increases.
Although the complexity of the calculations precluded analysis of large families,
we do present quantitative results for families of two and three persons. Com-
paring the two person outcome with that for three persons indicates the degree
of diminishing returns to the size of the risk sharing pool. The analysis
considers cases in which family members both do and do not have identical sur-
vival probabilities (are of similar ages). This framework permits us to ask
whether marriage betieen individuals with similar survival probabilities is
more efficient than marriage between individuals with dis—similar survival pro-
babilities.
Optimal family annuity contracts involve agreements on the consumption
path of each family member as well as a commitment on the part of each member to
name the other members as sole heirs in his estate. Section three discusses
the problems of enforcing both aspects of these agreements. In particular, we
contrast the Pareto efficient family annuity contracts with the equilibrium that
arises when each family member cheats on the other in the sense of consuming in
excess of the optimal family plan. Section four summarizes the paper and suggests
areas for future research.
I. A Single Persons Consumption Plans
With and Without Fair Annuities 2
In the absence of an annuity market a single consumption
choice problem is to maximize his expected utility (1) from current and
future consumption subject to the budget constraint, (2):
(1) EU = U(C)
(2) D cR_t=w t=o t 05
The of equation (1) are probabilities of surviving from age zero
through age t. P equals one. D is the maximum longevity. For simplicity,
we assume the utility function is separable in consumption (Cr) over time.
In (2) R, the discount factor, is one pins the interest rate.W
is the initial wealth of the individual; we ignore possible future earnings
streams.
The budget constraint written in equation (2) is identical to the budget
constraint that would arise in a certainty world in which individuals never
died before age D. While individuals will, on theaverage, die prior to age
D, equation (2) reflects the non—zero probability that an individual will
live through age D, i.e., equation (2) is the relevant budget constraint
because the individual may actually live throughage D, in which case his
realized present value of consumption cannot exceed his budget.
Let us now assume that the single person is free topurchase actuarially
fair annuities in a complete public annuities market. Thebudget constraint
in this case is:
(3) P c Rt=W t=ot 0
Incontrast with (2), (3) requires only anequality between the expected
present value of consumption and initial wealth. Thesingle individual now
chooses his optimal consumption path bymaximizing (1) subject to (3); he
then exchanges his initial wealth W with theinsurance company in return for
its promise to pay out theC stream as long as the person continues to live.
The PR in (3)maybe thought of as prices. -Since each of the
in (3), except P which equalsunity, is less than one, the consumption choice
in the case of a fair annuity market isequivalent to the consumption choice
without an annuity market, but with lowerprices of future consumption.6
Obviously, access to a fair annuity market increases utility by expanding
the budget frontier; it also alters the optimal consumption path because of
the income and substitution effects resulting from the lower prices of future
consumption.
The iso—elastic utility function (4) is convenient for assssing the
potential gains from access to afair, public annuities market as well as
the gains from family annuity arrangements.
cl-I D tt (4) EU =Z,P a
In (4) y is the constant relative risk aversion parameter, and a is the time
preference parameter. By considering different values of y we
indicate for this family of utility functions how the gains from annuities
and family arrangements depend on the specification of tastes.







inthe case of fair annuities, maximizing (4) subject to (3) leads to:
-
w(Ra)P"
tE.R1 a1P 3=0 -r
IiifigureI we compare (5)and(6) for the case R =a=1;uities (y=l)
No Annuities(y<l)
Theability to trade in a fair annuities market mayraiseor lower
initial consumption depending on whether y is less than or greater than
unity. Intuitively, the higher is the degree of risk aversion, y, the
greater is the concern for running out of money because of excessive long-
evity and, hence, the lower is initial consumption. At y equal to infinity,
(5) dictates equal consumption in each period.
Plugging (5) or (6) into (4),wearrive at two indirect utility functions
for the no—annuity and annuity cases with initial wealth, the interestrate, and
survival probabilities as arguments. These functions are presented in equations
(7) and (8) respectively.
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We measure the increase in utility resulting from access to fair annuities
in terms of dollars. From (9) we solve for the value of N which represents
the percentage increment in a single person's initial wealth required, in the
absence of an annuity market, to leave him as well off as he would be with no
additional wealth, but with access to an annuities market.
(9) H0(MW0) =v(w0)
For the iso—elastic utility function this calculation turns out to be independent
of the initial level of wealth. Table I reports values of M for different ages
and levels of risk aversion using both male and female survival probabilities.
The survival probabilities used in this and all subsequent calculations are
actuarial estimates from the Social Security Administration.3 Maximum longevity
is taken to be 120 throughout the paper.
Table I indicates that the utility gain measured in dollars from access
to an annuities market can be quite large. For a relative risk aversion
parameter value of .75 the gain to a 55 year old male is equivalent to a 46.90
percent increase in his initiaL wealth. The utility gain is age dependent;
for y =.75,the 30 year old maleTs gain is 24,46 percent, while the 90
year old male's gain is 99.81 percent. This reflects the low probabilities
of death when young; annuities are less important to young people because a
large fraction of their lifetime utility from consumption is fairly certain
due to their lower mortality probabilities in the immediate future. Higher
levels of risk aversion naturally increase the gains from access to an annui—9
I:
Percentage Increase in Initial Wealth Required to Obtain




Aversion (y) Males Females
30 .75 24.5 18.5
55 .75 46.9 34.4
75 .75 71.2 63.0
90 ..75 99.8 100.2
30 1.25 - 30.3 22.7
55 1.25 59.2 43.4
75 1.25 97.0 85.3
90 1.25 152.6 152.9
30 1.75 34.7 26.1
55 1.75 68.9 50.7
75 1.75 119.1 104.6
90 1.75 199.1 199.4
*Throughout table a.99 and R =1.0110
ties market. The male—female differences in the table reflect the higher
male age specific mortality rates. The calculation Is somewhat sensitive
to the choice of a and R. Raising the interest rate to 5 percent while
holding a constant increases the age 55 wealth equivalent factor from 46.90
to 55.57 for the case of '.75.The 90 year old wealth equivalent is
increased from 99.81 to 115.34.
Income, Substitution Effects, and Unintended Bequests
Without access to an annuity market a single non—altruistic individual
will always die prior to consuming all his wealth and, accordingly, make in-
voluntary bequests. The level of these unintended bequests can be quite
large. Using (5) we calculated the consumption path as well as the correspond-
ing wealth path for the no—annuity case. Multiplying the probability of dying
at each age times the wealth at each age and discounting back to the initial
age gives the present expected value of unintended bequests. For y =.75,
R =1.01and a =.99,the present expected value of unintended bequests repre-
sents 24.47 percent of initial wealth for a single male age 55. This number
means that a 55 year old male with no annuity market will, on average, fail to
consume about one quarter of his wealth because he is risk averse. Increasing
the risk aversion coefficient to 1.75 raises the ratio of present unintended
bequests to initial wealth to .3583. These large, unintended bequests occur
despite a fairly rapid rate of consumption. In table II we present the optimal
age consumption and age wealth paths for a 55 year old single male with no
access to annuities and initial wealth of $100,000. Even for high values of
risk aversion, current mortality probabilities dictate a fairly rapid rate of
consumption. For y =1.75a single male surviving to age 85 consumes less than
one third of his age 55 consumption level.11
II:
Age Consumption and Age Wealth Paths
for Single Male with No Annuities
Risk
Age Aversion Consumption Wealth
55 .75 6825 $100,000
65 .75 4720 47,415




95 .75 10 30
55 1.25 5465 100,000
65 1.25 4395 57,200
75 1.25 2810 23,675
85 1.25 990 5,165
95 1.25 110 475
55 1.75 4795 100,000
65 1.75 4100 62,680
75 1.75 2980 30,680
85 1.75 1415 9,505
95 1.75 295 1,690
R =1.01a =.99
—12
The homotheticiy property of the iso—elastic utility function permits
us to use the ratio of present unintended bequests to initial wealth in separat-
ing the utility gains from fair annuities into income and substitution effects.
Suppose a fair insurance company approached a single age 55 year old
(y =.75)male and offered to pay him 24.47 percent of his initial wealth in
exchange for his naming the insurance company as his heir on his will. The
single male would take the 24.47 percent gain and, because of homotheticity,
consume it according to his original no—annuity consumption path. This
additional wealth would give rise to an additional .2447 times .2447 present
expected bequest. Letting the insurance company also pay for this second
round expected bequest and letting the process continue until convergence,
the insurance company ends up paying 32.40 =.2447/1—.2447percent of the
single individual's initial wealth. This 32.40 percent figure represents the
utility gain from the pure income effect, In this scenario the individual
continues to consume at the no—annuity set of prices. Since the total gain
from being able to purchase fair annuities and thus face lower prices for
future consumption is 46.90 percent, the income effect represents 69.08
percent and the substitution effect 30.92 percent of the total gain.
II. The Family as an Incomplete Annuities 1ärket
Decisions by family members concerning consumption expenditures and inter—.
family transfers may reflect implicit, although incomplete, annuity contracts.
For example, when two individuals get married they generally agree to pooi
their-resources while both marriage partners are alive, and also to name each
other as the major, if not the sole, beneficiary in their wills. For each
partner the risk of living "too long" is somewhat hedged; if one partner lives
to be very old, there is a high probability that his Cor her) spouse had already13
died leaving him (her) a bequest to help finance his (her) consumption.
While each spouse will gain just from the exchanging of wills, they can
further increase their expected utilities by agreeing on a joint consunip—
tion path taking into account each spouse's expected bequest to the other.
The importance of joint consumption planning is highlighted in the case of
an implicit contract between a parent and a child. Here the parent impli-
citly promises to name the child in his will in exchange for the child's
implicit promise to care for the parent if the parent lives too long. Al-
though the child may have zero probability of dying while the parent is still
alive, both can gain because the child agrees to share consumption resources
with the parent.
Mutually advantageous arrangements between family members do not require
either equal consumption by each family member or equal initial endowments.
If an old male marries a very young female and each enter the marriage with
the same dowry, the young female can compensate the old male for his higher
expected bequests by consuming less than the male while they are both alive.
Alternatively, the old male and the young female could consume equally while
married; in this case the young female could compensate the old male for his
higher mortality probabilities by entering the marriage with a larger dowry.
The set of Pareto efficient family contracts is derived by maximizing a weighted
sum of each family member's own expected utility from consumption subject to
the constraint that consumption of surviving family members not exceed their
own resources plus inheritances received from deceased family members.
This view of bequest and consumption arrangements within marriage as an
incomplete annuity market becomes intuitive when one contemplates increasing
the number of members in the family. To simplify the issue, let us assume14
that all individuals within the family have identical survival probabilities,
and that they enter this multi—person family with identical resources. In
the limit as the family, or perhaps "tribe" is a better word, gets large, the
consumption path of an individual within the tribe converges to the path a
single individual would choose in a complete and actuarially fair annuities
market. While we prove this proposition for the multi—period case in appendix
A, a two period model can exhibit the main idea.
Since all family members are identical, the family maximizes the expected
utility of a representative family member's consumption in period zero, C0, and
consumption in period one, C1. Let N+l be the number of family members and
i+1 be the number of members who survive to period one; the two period budget
constraint is then:





Theterm R() is the random intertemporal rate of return. Each person in the
family consumes C0 of his endowment in period zero. For a period one sur-
vivor the return on savings reflects the interest rate plus his share of the
bequests of those who die. Assuming that each member has an identical pro—
N+l 1 (1_p)N+1
bability, P, of surviving to period one, the expected value of is —
Theexpected return is lower (the price of consumption in period one is higher)
here than in the annuity case because of the possibility that all family members
die simultaneously. As n goes to infinity this expected value converges to
The vriance of this return also converges to zero, implying that the family's
consumption choices C0 and C1 cànverge to the choices made in a perfect annuity
market.15
Quantitative Analysis of Family Risk Pooling
In the case of two family members the frontier of efficient marriage
contracts is obtained as the solution to the following dynamic programming
troblem:
(11) Vt1(W1) =max[u(CH1)+ uS(c51) +aP,1Qt1V(W)
W,C1,C1 > 0, t=T,. ..,l
÷aP/1(l_Q,1)H(W) + OaQ, 1(l—P, S(W)]
(12)W/R + C1 ÷ C_1= W]
where VT(WT) =maxUH(c) +ouS(c)
C ,CT
In (11) Vt(W) is the period t maximum weighted expected utility of the
twofamilymembers with joint wealth W. In the expression the letters H and
S denote the two family members. C and C are the consumptions of the two
and uS are their utility functions andP1 and t/t—l are their respec-
tive period t survival probabilities onditiona1 upon surviving through period
t—l. H(W) and S(W) are the maximum expected utilities for each member if
he orshe alone survives to period t. These expressions are obtained from
(7) by replacing W0 and W and applying the appropriate probabilities. 0 is
the differential weight applied to member S's expected utility.
The first two terms on the right hand side of (11)represent utility from
certain period t—l consumption. The third term is the family's expectedperiod16
t utility multiplied by the probability that both members survive to period t.
The last two terms represent expected utilities when one member dies and the
other survives.
Appendix B presents an algorithm which we programmed on the computer to
solve (11). The algorithm for solving the three family member maximization
problems is available from the authors.
Marriage as an Annuity Contract
The solution to (11) permits us to contrast consumption paths and utility
levels of married people with those of single persons, assuming throughout that
there is no public annuities market. Both spouses are assumed to have identical
iso—elastic utility functions in the sense of the same degrees of risk aversion
and rates of time preference.
The shape of consumption paths for married couples while they are
both alive may differ from that of single individuals for two reasons.
First, even if the two spouses have identical survival probabilities, the
reduction in risk within the marriage rate acts like a reduction in the
price of future consumption. If the relative risk aversion parameter y
exceeds (is less than) one, the identical survival probabilities marriage
profile will start above (below) the single person's profile. For y
equal to unity the profiles are identical (see Appendix). If we drew these
consumption profiles for married persons in figure 1 they would start between
the no annuity and complete annuity profiles.
The second reason why the consumption profiles for married people may
differ from that of single people is possible differences in spousal survival
probabilities. Higher survival probabilities act like lower rates of time
preferences. When an old man marries a young female the slope of the optimal
marriage consumption profile reflects the survival probabilities of both the17
husband and the young wife. The two spouses compromise with respect to the
rate at which they should eat up their joint wealth while they are both alive.
The old husband would prefer to eat up the wealth more rapidly, and the young
wife would prefer to consume at a slower rate. The formula for each spouse's
consumption when married takes both spouses' survival probabilities into
account as well as the relative spousal utility weights.
In table III we report the gains from marriage between two individuals
who have identical survival probabilities, identical initial endowments,
and are weighted equally in the marriage contract. We report
marriage gains using both male and female survival probabilities.
The marriage gain is calculated as the percentage increase in a single
person's initial wealth needed to make him (her) as well as he (she) would be
in the marriage. The table also reports the marriage gain as a fraction
of the Table I total gain from complete and fair annuities. These utility
gains are measured in terms of their dollar equivalents. Since utility is
concave in wealth the dollar gain from marriage as a fraction of the dollar
gain from fair annuities is smaller than the actual utility gain from
marriage as a fraction of the utility gain from fair annuities. Table II
also reports this latter fraction which indicates how much of the utility
4
gain from annuities is captured by marriage.
The figures in table III indicate that marriage can offer substantial
risk pooling opportunities. For a fifty—five year old man using male
survi'val probabilities, pooling risk through marriage is equivalent to
about a twenty percent increase in his wealth if he had stayed single. The
gains from marriage increase the older one becomes since the risks to be
incurred are much greater as one ages. At age seventy—five for a relative
risk aversion parameter of 1.25 getting married is equivalent to increasing









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































quite important even at young ages. The table reports gains from 11.7 to
13.6 percent at age thirty using the male probabilities.
Marriage can also close much of the utility gap between no annuities
and complete annuities. For example, for a fifty—five year old with risk
aversion of .75, the marriage gain measured in dollars represents 42.5 percent
of the full annuities gain measured in dollars. In terms of utility, marriage
substitutes 46.10 percent for complete and fair annuities. Interestingly,
marriage appears to be a somewhat better substitute for fair annuities at
younger ages. In addition, there appears to be an interaction between
age and the degree of risk aversion making marriage a better substitute
for fair annuities at young ages when risk aversion is low and at old ages
when risk aversion is high.
Three Person Polygamy and Diminishing Returns in Risk Pooling
We next consider the case of three individuals with identical survival
probabilities and initial endowments who agree to maximize the sum of
their utilities sublect to the constraint that realized consumption can not
exceed their pooled resources. The utility maximization is similar to (11);
it takes into account each survival contingency, i.e., that either all three,
two, one, or none of the individuals will be alive and mayinheritat each
point in the future.
Table IV records the utility gains from three person polygamy (three
sisters would do just as nicely). Over a wide range of ages and parameter
values three people appear to be capable of capturing about sixty percent
of the gains from fair annuities. While the complexity of the calculations
precluded considering a four person arrangement, we can conjecture using
tables III and IV how well four people would do together. For example, for20
IV:
The Annuity Gains from Three Person Polygomy
Percent Polygomy Utility Gain!
Age Risk Aversion Dollar Gain Fair Annuity Utility Gain
30 .75 15.85 .665
55 .75 28.04 .632
75 .75 37.16 .571
90 .75 43.10 .496
30 l.25 18.05 .635
55 1.25 32.08 .612
75 1.25 45.18 .571
90 1.25 58.17 .524
30 1.75 19.33 .619
55 1.75 34.51 .613
75 1.75 50.74 .596
90 1.75 68.68 .579
Table uses male probabilities,.R =1.01,a =.9921
a fifty year old male 'with risk aversion of .75, adding one marriage partner
is equivalent to a twenty percent increase in his wealth had he remained
single. From table III the marginal dollar gain from adding a third person is
8.04 percent. If the marginal dollar gain fell at a constant rate in this range,
8.04 5 thefourth person would add 8.04 X 20 0 =3.23percent. By adding
3.23 to 28.04, we can roughly calculate the extent to which four people can
close the utility gap. This procedure suggests that four people can sub-
stitute by seventy percent for a fair annuities market.
Diminishing returns to risk pooling appears, then, to set in at a
fairly rapid rate. For this example, two people can substitute by 46 percent,
three people by 63 percent, and four people by over 70 percent for full in-
surance.
Is Marrying People of Similar Ages More Efficient?
Suppose you have to decide how to pair up four people, two who are old
and two who are young. Assume that the two old people have identical survival
probabilities, that the two young people have identical survival probabilities,
and that each of the four have the same initial wealth. Is it more efficient
to marry the old people together and the young people together than it is
to mix ages?
Thete appear to be two competingarguments involved here. On the
one hand marrying the old with the young minimizes society's expected loss
of resources arising when both marriage partners die early.6 To see this,
assume .that old people have a probability p of dying in the next period and
that young people have a probability q of dying in the next period. If we
marry the old with the old and the young with the young, there is a probability
p2 that both the old people will die and a probability q2 that both theyoung22
will die in the next period. If both couples were bringing the same resources
w into the second period, society's expected loss of resources equals (p2 + q2)w.
If, however, we married the old with the young, the expected resource loss
from the old spouse and the young spouse dying simultaneously is 2pqw. Now
(p2 + q2 —2pg)w=(p—q)2w and, hence, the expected loss in resources to
society is greater from marrying the old with the old and the young with
the young. Intuitively, marrying two ninety year olds together and two twenty
year olds together leava large chance that both ninety year olds will die
in the immediate future; any resources which they have failed to consume
will be lost to the twenty year olds who, on average, will still be alive.
This expected loss of resources to society (by society we mean the
four people), will be greater the greater the degree of risk aversion, since
high levels of risk aversion will lead our hypothetical ninety year olds to
postpone consumption.
The contervailing argument against mixed age marriages is that mixing
ages involves greater risk to one of the two partners; the utility cost of
this greater risk may exceed the utility gain from the increase in expected
resources arising in mixed marriages. To see this consider an old—young
marriage in which the young person promises to consume less than the old
person in the state of nature in which both spouses survive. Suppose that
this promise to the old person o(higher consumption in the "both survive"
state is large enough to exactly compensate the old person for the loss in
expecied utility from the state in which his spouse dies, but he survives.
The old person's expected utility from this latter "bequest" state is lower
when he marries someone young, rather than someone old, because the probability
of the young person actually dying is smaller. While the old person is by23
assumption no worse off in this compensated old—young marriage, the young
person could be worse off than had she (he) married someone young. By
entering into this compensated old—young marriage, the young person reduces
her (his) payoff in the "both survive" state while leaving the payoff in the
"bequest"state unchanged. She (he) also increases the probability of the
"bequest" state and lowers the probability of the "both survive" state.
Although expected consumption for the young spouse rises, the spreading of
thepayoffs may lower expected utility depending on the young spouse's
degree of risk aversion.
We investigated for our iso—elastic utility function potential efficiency
gains from mixed marriage between two fifty—five year olds and two thirty
year olds, where each individual was risk averse at the .75 level. The
fifty—five year olds were given male survival probabilities, while the thirty
year olds had female survival probabilities. From table III we know that
the two fifty—five year olds would, by marrying, enjoy an increase in
expected utility worth twenty percent of their initial wealth. If the two
younger people married, their equivalent dollar gain would equal 9.31 percent
for each.
Marrying the old with the young, assuming an equal consumption (equal
weighting) marriage contract, would leave the old person worse off and the
young person better off then if they were single. This reflects the fact
that while both partners compromise on how fast they should consume their
joint wealth, the older person is much more likely to die and therefore
bequeath first.This equal consumption marriage gives the young person a
39.7 percent gain, while the old person loses an equivalent of 13.1 percent
of his wealth. By weighting the utility of the old spouse more heavily
than the utility of the young spouse in the marriage, we consider whether
the utility gains to the young spouse are sufficient to compensate the old24
spouse and leave both 'better off than had they married individuals
their ow-n age.
Table V exhibits the old—young utility frontier measured in terms of
the equivalent dollar gains which result from differential weighting of the
old and young in the marriage. When risk aversion equals .75, -weights
of 1.7 for the old person and 1 for the young person yield utility levels
for both old and young which exceed those in the old—old, young—young marriages.
The additional gain to the old person from this weighted marriage with the
young person is 3.1 prcent; the added gain to the young person is 1.6
percent. The table also indicates the old spouse's share of total family
consumption while both spouses are alive; this share of consumption is deter-
mined by the utility weights.
When the risk aversion parameter is 1.75 a weight of 2.9 applied to
the old person's utility yields outcomes pareto superior to those in the old—
old, young—young marriages. Here the old person's additional gain is .7
percent, while the young person's extra gain is 5.2 percent.
These additional gains from mixed age marriages require, however, a
fairly skewed distribution of consumption within the marriage. In both of
the table V examples, the young—old weightingscheme that dominates old—old,
young—young coupling involve the older spouse consuming about 86 percent
more than the younger spouse while lhey are both alive. If it is too
costly to negotiate such an arrangement within the marriage, or if the type
of conumption (e.g., housing), within marriage is non—excludable, then equal
consumption marriages of individuals with similar survival probabilities (of
similar ages) will be the rule rather than the exception. Of course,
we have been discussing here marriages in which each spouse has25
V:
The Mixed—Marriage Utility Frontier*
Old Person's Old Person's Degree of Old Person'sYoung Person's
Utility WeightConsumption Risk Aversion Percent Percent Dollar
Share Dollar Gain Gain
1 .50 .75 —13.1 39.7
1.1 .53 .75 —6.7 34.7
1.2 .56 .75 —.1 30.5
1.3 .59 .75 4.8 25.6
1.4 .61 .75 10.0 21.5
1.5 .63 .75 14.7 17.6
1.6 .65 .75 19.1 14.0
1.7 .67 .75 23.1 10.6
1.8 .69 .75 26.9 7.3
1.9 .70 .75 30.4 4.3
2.0 .71 .75 33.7 1.5
1 .50 1.75 —9.3 42.2
1.3 .54 1.75 —1.1 36.1
1.6 .57 1.75 5.6 31.0
1.9 .59 1.75 11.0 26.7
2.3 .62 1.75 17.1 21.8
2.6 .63 1.75 20.9 18.7
2.9 .65 1.75 24.2 15.8
*Young person's weight is 1. R =1.01,c. =.99.26
the same initial dowry. The old—young marriages can dominate old—old, young—
young marriages even under an equal consumption arrangement provided the dowry
of the young spouse exceeds that of the old spouse to a sufficient degree.
Incomplete Annuity Arrangements Among Multiple Family Members
In this section we consider incomplete annuity arrangements between
two parents and one child and between one parent and two children. As in
the case of a marriage between old and young spouses, parents and children
can jointly pool the risks of uncertain death.
In table VI we present the gains from implicit annuity contracting within
our two types of families. In both cases we assume equal consumption of
all family members, but permit the initial wealth of the child or children
to vary. All individuals are assumed to have the male survival probabilities;
the children are age thirty and the parents age fifty—five. The family
dynamic program is presented 'in the appendix. In each family
we maximize the sum of the three individual's expected utility taking all
survival contingencies into account. If two out of three family members
die simultaneously, the third inherits the remaining family wealth.
If one of the three dies first, the other two jointly inherit the remaining
family wealth and consume according to the equal weight optimal marriage
contract described above.
The numbers in table VI indicate the percentage dollar increment to
wealth needed to make a single fifty—five year old or thirty year old with
the indicated initial wealth as well off as had he (she) participated in a
consumption sharing family arrangement.27
VI:
Gains from Incomplete Annuity
Arrangements in the Family*
Two Parents with OneChild Two Children with OneParent
Initial Wealth Percent Dollar Percent DollarPercent DollarPercent Dollar
of Each Child Gain to Parent Gain to Child Gain to ParentGain to Child
25,000 14.4 34.2 2.3 24.8
30,000 23.2 20.4 16.9 18.9
35,000 32.0 10.6 31.5 14.6
40,000 40.8 3.2 46.1 11.5
*The Calculations assume equal consumption by all family members.
Initial wealth of parent or parents is $20,000. R =1.01,a =.99,
andy =.75.28
A comparison of table I with table VI indicates how well these small
family arrangements can substitute for complete annuity contracts. For
example, in the case of two parents with one child, if the child has an
initial wealth of 35,000 and the parents have an initial wealth of 20,000,
entering into an equal consumption—will swapping arrangement is equivalent
for each parent to a 32 percent increase in wealth and for the child to a
10.6 percent increase in wealth. For each parent this arrangement captures
71.2 percent of the utility gain from full annuities; for the child the
arrangement substitutes by 45.4 percent for full annuities.
The last two columns of table VI tell a very similar story. Here we
are dealing with the case of two children contracting with one parent.
When each child contributes $35,000, the gain to the parent is 31.5 percent,
while each thirty year old child enjoys a 14.6 percent gain relative to
consuming as a single person. The numerical differences in the table
for the two different types of families reflect, on the one hand, different
monetary contributions of parents relative to children and, on the other
hand, differences in the rate at which resources are consumed when all
families are alive. Resources are consumed at a slower rate in the two
children—one parent case than in the one child—two parent case since each
individual's survival probabilities are given equal weight in determining
atheoptimal rate of consumption.
III. Enforcement with and without Altruism
There are two elements in the marriage contracts we have described
which raise questions of enforcement. One problem is that a spouse may
covertly name a third party as beneficiary on his will in exchange for the
same commitment by the third party or simply in exchange for a particular29
service. This typeofcheating is, however, dangerous. There is always
the possibility that the other spouse will demandinspection of the will,
or, even if a second will is hidden away, that the spouse will somehow become
aware of it. Such disclosure could destroy the marriage, leaving the
cheating spouse with a soiled reputation and unable to engage in additional
implicit annuity contracting with either children or a newspouse. In
addition, the state, to a limited extent, plays a role in enforcing the
initial implicit marriage contract. Thus, the courts will rule invalida
last minute change in a will which, for example, endows a death bednurse to the
exclusion of a wife who has lived with andperhaps taken care of the decedent
husband for years.
A second type of cheating is simply that one or bothspouses consumes
in excess of the consumption levels dictatedby an optimal implicit
marriage contract. While each spouse may correctly believe that he or she
is the beneficiary on the other spouse's will, eachmay try to take advantage
of the other by increasing his (her) own consumption and thusreducing the
potential bequest available to the other spouse. The ability to observe one's
spouse's consumption within the marriage shouldeffectively internalize
and eliminate this free—rider problem.
This second type of consumption cheatingas well as the first type of
cheating, viz., multiple will swapping,may be more problematic for implicit
incomplete annuity agreements between friends or relatives whoare physically
separated. The consumption cheating scenariocan be modeled as a Nash equili-
brium in which each partner chooses hisconsumption path taking the
other partner's consumption path and,therefore, potential bequest path as
given. The first order conditions for this nashequilibrium strategy are30 -
availablefrom the authors.Resources are consumed at a faster rate in
the Nash equilibrium as each partner fails to consider how his consumption
will diminish his expected bequest and thus the expected utility of his
partner.
Using male survival probabilities we calculated for twofifty—five
year olds the dollar equivalent utility gain relative to being single from
engaging in a Nash consumption cheating partnership. The utility gains in
the Nash equilibrium proved to be almost identical to those in the more ef-
ficient marriage contract. Atlevels of risk aversion (y) of .75, 1.25,
and 1.75 the percentage dollar increments are respectively 19.9, 22.2, and
23.5. While the rate of consumption is faster in the Nash equilibrium, it
is not much faster than in the marriage contract. For example, when risk
aversion is .75 and the interest rate and rate of time preference equal one
percent, age fifty—five consumption in the Nash equilibrium equals 6.5 percent
of age fifty—five wealth; in the marriage contract age fifty—five consumption
is 6.4 percent of age fifty—five wealth. Intuitively cheating by over
consuming is fine provided one's partner actually dies; but if one's partner
survives then the early excessive consumptions will require relative deprivation
later on. Apparently this latter consideration dominates the former leaving
utility inthe cheating equilibrium at essentially the same level as under
a marriage contract. These examples suggest that consumption cheating does
not represent a substantial impediment to consumption risk sharing arrangements,
Aside from the questions of third party will swapping, there appear
to be ways of structuring the payments of individuals within the family
so as to insure the viability of these implicit contracts. An equal
consumption marriage contract between two individuals with the same31
survival probabilities and same initial endowments is a good first
example. If each spouse maintains control over his own wealth while both
spouses are alive and consumes at the same rate as the other spouse, then
each will separately have an incentive to continue the contract at every
point in time. A similar type of individual control can be maintained
in family arrangements; rather than have the parents use up all their
resources before the children begin to contribute to their support, the
children can contribute each period in return for that period's expected
parental bequest. This scenario of parents maintaining control over their
wealth until the very end as enforcement leverage over their childrenmay
partly explain the limited use of gifts as a tax saving intergenerational
transfer device.
Another means of enforcing these implicit contracts is simply altruism.
All of our calculations have involved maximizing a weightedsum of individual
family member's utilities. If, however, each family member is altruistic
towards each other and each weights each family member's utility fromcon-
sumption in the same way, then all family members would unanimouslyagree
on the utility maximand. The calculations we have presented can, therefore,
be thought of as resulting from the maximization of anagreed upon altruistic
family utility function. Since all family members agree on the maximand,
there Is no problems of enforcement.
This discussion suggests the empirical difficulties if not impos—
sibLtIty of determining whether intergenerational transfers reflect altruism
or simply risk mitigating arrangements of essentially selfish individuals
in the absence of perfect insurance markets. Distinguishing between the32
selfish and altruistic models is fundamental to a number of major economic
questions including the impact of the social security system on national
saving and the effectiveness of fiscal policy.7
V. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has demonstrated that consumption and bequest sharing
arrangements within marriage and larger families can substitute to a large
extent for complete and fair annuity markets. In the absence of such public
markets, individualshave strong economic incentives to establish relation-
ships which provide risk mitigating opportunities. Within marriages and
families there is a degree of trust, information, and love which aids in
the enforcement of risk sharing agreements. Our calculations indicate
that pooling the risk of death can be an important economic incentive
for family formation; the paper also suggests that the current instability
in family arrangements may, to some extent, reflect recent growth in pension
and social security public annuities. The methodological approach of this
paper can be applied to the study of family insurance against other types
of risks. Of chief interest are those types of risks which anonymous public
markets handle very poorly. Disability insurance and insurance against
earnings losses are good examples.
Our approach has been to compare family insurance with perfect insurance.
It would seem worthwhile to compare family insurance with public market in-
surance where the market insurance is subject to adverse selection and moral
hazard problems and family insurance is not. Realistic specification of the
degree of adverse selection and moral hazard may indicate that family insurance
dominates public market insurance even in small families.33
FOOTNOTES
We are grateful for financial support from the Foundation for Research
in Economic Education and the National Bureau of Economic Research. Any
opinions expressed are solely our own.
*We wish to thank Finis Welch, Joe Ostroy, Bryan Ellickson, John McCall,
Steven Shavell, John Riley, Jon Skinner, and Gary Galles for helpful discussions.
1The transaction costswe have in mind here include the time costs in-
volved in negotiating individual specific annuity contracts. As we demonstrate
in the text, each individual's optimal annuity contract depends on his rate of
time preference, his degree of risk aversion, and his survival probabilities.
Some individuals may prefer a constant annuity stream; others an increasing or
decreasing stream of annuity payments.
2Yaari (1965) is the pioneeringpaper on this subject.
3We use the low morality male and femaleprobabilities reported on pages
17 and 19 of the Social Security Administration Actuarial Study No. 62.
4 . (l+m)1-l This fraction is calculated as 1 , wherem is the fractional wealth
(l+a)'' —1
equivalent gain from marriage, and a is the fractional wealth equivalent gain
from fair annuities.
5This is probably a lower bound estimate for thecontribution of the fourth
person; the marginal dollar gain can't fall at a constant 40 rcent rate for-
ever, because if it did the total dollar gains would, in the limit, not sum
up to46.9 percent, the full annuity gain of table 1. Presumably the marginal
dollar gain falls at a decreasing rate and 3.23 percent probably underestimates
the fourth person's marginal contribution.
6We are grateful to Finis Welch forsuggesting this line of argument.
7See Barro (1974).34
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aAPPENDIX A
Proof that Family Annuity Contracting Converges to a Complete Annuities Contract
As we discuss in the text, the family budget constraint, assuming
identical family members, converges to the budget constraint that a single
individual would face in a complete annuities market. We now demonstrate
that as family size increases family annuity contracting leads to a consump-
tion path for each identical family member that converges to the consumption
path of an individual with perfect annuities. In addition, each family
member's expected utility converges to the expected utility with complete
annuities. The proof is based on Jensen's inequality and Fatou's lemma.
For a family with N+l identical members the optimal consumption of each
member at time t—l, Cr1, is obtained as the solution to the following
recursive problem:
(Al) V1(W1) =maxu(C_i) +EV1(w
subject to:
=w, o<c<w R t—l t—l —t—l—t—l
and
V(WT) =u(WT)for all N > 1
In(Al) a is the time preference factor, and is the probability
of survival through period t conditional upon surviving through t—l.
Let (C1,WN)bethe optimal solution to (Al). Since we assume strict
concavity of u, the solution is unique. Also let (C1,W) be the optimal
solution to an individual's choice problem in a complete annuities market.
This problem may be written recursively as:A- 2
(A2) V (W )= maxu(C )+aq V*(W t—1 t—l t—l t t t
subject to:
W




It can easily be shown that and V inherit the strict concavity, mono—
tonicity, and differentiability of u.
We now state ourmain result:
Theorem: For all t =0,...,T,liin =t t
urn =t t
lim VN(W) =V*(Wt) for all W.
t
The proof of this theorem is arranged in a sequence of one remark and four
lemmas.
N N+l
We define the random variable X =—----—, wherei+l is the number of
i+l
suLJvors out of N+l people when each has probability p of surviving.
N+l




_____ E(XN)=(N+l)N p (1p)N_i
1 N 1N+l
Tsing the. combinatorial identity —() — (.), weobtain








Weuse recursive induction on t and Remark 1 to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1 For all N >0, V(W) > V(W).
Proof: For t =Tthe condition clearly holds. We now prove the condition holds




=u(C1)+ E V(W XN) < u(C1) + ctqV(E W XN)
The first inequality follows from the induction assumption; the second follows






Thelast inequality holds because (C1,W) are maximizing values of (A2).
Corollary 1: l V(Wt) < V(W) for all t =0,...,T, W > 0.
The following lemma establishes a technical property of {VN}0.
Lemma 2: {v N constitutes an equi—continuous family of functions.
Proof: It is sufficient to show that -(W) is uniformly bounded by a
number ?(W) from above and by a number m(W) from below. W is held
*
For a discussion of this concept see Royden, p. 177.A4
constant throughout the proof; the proof is by induction. For t=T,M =m•
=u'.






(A4) u' (C1) =ctqRE --(W q(l_q)N_1
(A4) is the first order condition for a maximum of (Al). (A3) is sometimes
referred to as an "envelope theorem" and may be obtained by noting that the
two sides are equal to the same Lagrange multiplier for the constrained
maximization problem (Al). N
Since u' is declining and <W1:w >u'(W1)
u'(W1) is, therefore, the uniformly lower bound forall N, mi(W1). To obtain an
upper bound we note that:
(W) j W) <Mt(w).
The first inequality holds because the derivative of aconcave function is
declining; the second follows from the induction assumption. These expres-
sions and (A4) imply:
u'(C1) <aq. R).
Now, letC1 and W satisfy u'(C1) = the constraint
=_1
—c_i)Clearly -C hence. u' (C1) <'tl'
and
u(a )isthe uniform upper bound on tl, M1. Q.E.D. t t—l
Lemma 3: lim vN(w )= V*(W)forall 0 <t < Tand W .Weagain use induc— N ttt t — t
tionto prove this proposition. For t=T the condition holds trivially. Let
(Cj,W )bea subsequence of (Cr1, converging to (Ci,W).A5
This subsequence exists because the sequence is bounded. To facilitate the
notation we drop the subscript k.
The key step is to show that:
=V()
We now specify the random variable as a function from the infinite
sample space ç ={o,i}x {o,i} x ...tothe Reals by writing xN(w) =
wherei is the number of l's in the first N coordinates of w}.
From the Strong Law of Large Numbers, 1 XN(w) =l/qa.e. in 2. The
N t
next step is to define the random variable:
No={vi(WNx(w)): where i is the number of l's in the first N
coordinates of w}
As N-', i-'a.e. By the induction assumption V(w) -V(w) for all
and also w xN() Fromequi—continuity, V(W xN(w)) -V(—).
N t *
Soy (w) +V(—)a.e.,and Fatou's Lemma may be applied.
Z ) q(l_q)N_l =
Hence:
urn
,.N()> f V(—) =
Thisis true for every converging subsequence.
Fi-om this lemma and Corollary 2 we have the result:
i vi(wi) =Vi(Wi) Q.E.D.




Lemma 4: Ct C t =0,...,T.
Again let C1} denote a subsequence converging to and let
(C1,Wi) be another feasible consumption plan.
For all N, the optimality of (C1,W) implies
u(C1) +V(q(l_q)Nlu(C_1) + -o (W qi(l_q)N_l
By repeating the argument of Leimna 3 the two sides tend to:
u(tl) +v() >u(C1) + V()
Since (C1,W) was arbitrarily chosen (Ci,W) solves the maxmimization
problem (12). Hence =(c1,W),
since the solution to (12) is
N
unique because of strong concavity. But if every subsequence of Ct_l
converges to C1, it means that the entire sequence is converging aswell.
Q.E.D.APPENDIX B
Computational Algorithm For the Two Family Members Dynamic Risk Pooling Problem
This appendix indicates the algorithm used to solve the two family members
dynamic programming pro1em, copied here as B(l). The algorithm for
the case of three family members is similar to that for two members and is
available from the authors. While we consider the iso—elastic family of
utility functions, our algorithm can be applied to any homothetic utility
function.





(B2) Wt/R + + C1 =W1
Again, the lettersH and S correspond to the two family members with respective
conditional survival probabilities i—1 and Wis joint family wealth,
and U is the weighting factor. Ht(W) and S(W) are the expected
utility levels for each family member if he alone survives to period t.
Optimal values for C and C are found recursively starting at period T
and proceeding to period 0. We demonstrate that V(W) may be written in
the form:
W1-Y
(B3) V(W) =v where V IS a constant. We also show that total




v'' + (aKR)1'' R1
where is another constant. Given total family consumption, consumption of
the two members is:
B5 H—C1 s— _______ () C1
—, c1—c1
Wedemonstrate that Kt is a function of v and thatv1 is a function of
Kt. Starting then at the initial value for Kt. K,ri, we can compute VT;
VT lfl turn gives Kr which, in turn gives VT1• Proceeding in this fashion
to period zero we compute the entire sequence of Vt'S and Kr's. These values
can then be used in (B4) to compute the ratio of consumption to wealth at each
period. These ratios together with an initial level of wealth plus (B2)
and (B5) generate the optimal consumption path. The homotheticity of the
utility function permits us to calculate recursively the shape of the con-
sumption path independently of the initial level of wealth.
Starting with period T the (Bi) maximization problem is:
vT(WT)
=max + 0
s.t.C + C <WT,
>0.










Fort< T, (Bi) for the iso—elastic case iswritten as:B3
1 H )1_Y+ _L (CS )l—Y (B8) V1(w1) =max --(Cvi 1 t-l
C_1 ,C1





E'_1_i t 1—y t
w
s.t. C1+CS +—=w t—1 R t—1
w1




=s for the iso—elastic utility function. The values for
ands are implicitly defined as the bracketed term in equation (7) in the text
with j =0corresponding to time t and with each family member's survival
probabilities from time t substitutes for P..
3
Itis easy to see from (B8) that for given total family consumption,
and CS will always satisfy (B5). Hence we mayrewrite(B8) as: t t
_Lc'Y+ (B9) Vi(wi) =—lVTl—y t—l
P P P
____)h + 0(1-Pt-l
tv + (1 —
t1
Denoting the term in brackets by Kt we now have:
1 C1'+ct—--W1'I( (BlO) V (w ) t—1 t—l
=
VT l—y t—ll—y tt
w
+ =w s.t. tiR t—1
Maximizing (310) and computing the indirect utility functions yields
1/y+(aRK )l/IR1) (Bil)v1 =(VT t
l/y
VT (B12) C=w
t—lt—l 1/I
VT + (aKtRY'R1